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Copyright Marine Corps Association
Oct 1951
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"Reprinted courtesy of the Marine
Corps Gazette. Copyright retained by the Marine Corps Gazette."
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MAP
CLICK HERE
AT WONSAN THE LEATHERNECKS DID NOT FIND IT
necessary to storm ashore and fight for the beaches. Not a shot was fired
to oppose the landing of the 1st Mar Div from 25 to 27 October at the
leading seaport of Northeast Korea.
It was, in short, simply an administrative
landing which grew out of the amphibious assault planned by X Corps before
the end of the Inchon-Seoul operation.* The troopships, after rounding the
southern tip of Korea on their way from Inchon, were kept waiting for a
week while the Navy cleared the mines left in the harbor by retreating
North Korean forces. But the town itself had already been occupied without
a struggle by ROK troops advancing up the east coast from southern Korea.
Among the 280 landings recorded in the 175-year
history of the Marine Corps, there was never a tamer one. On 14 October the
first elements of VMF-312 were flown to Wonsan from Japan to provide the
rare spectacle of Marine airmen making themselves at home in the objective
area before the appearance of the landing force. As the final anticlimax,
the assault troops learned upon arrival that Bob Hope and Marilyn Maxwell
had preceded them to put on a USO show.
Why had the amphibious operation been
changed to an administrative landing after a series of seemingly confused
plans and orders? This was the question which perplexed the men of the 1st
Mar Div at the end of their tedious voyage. Yet the answers might have been
found in the very extent of the victory which the Leathernecks themselves
had recently helped to win. For the coordinated offensive launched on 15-16
September by all United Nations forces in the peninsula had nearly achieved
its purpose of destroying the North Korean Army as a fighting force. While
X Corps, with the 1st Mar Div as landing force, cut the main enemy line of
communications at Inchon and Seoul, the Eighth U. S. Army drove westward
and northward to rout the NK forces holding the initiative along the Pusan
Perimeter. By the second week of October the enemy was too shattered to put
up any organized resistance at Wonsan other than sowing the harbor with
mines.
Before this result could be fully
anticipated. X Corps alerted its units on 29 September-the date of the
official liberation of Seoul - as to the possibility of an amphibious
assault at Wonsan. Five days later a X Corps operational order directed the
1st Mar Div, then actively engaged north of Seoul, to serve as the landing
force. Ships from the 7th Fleet, which had remained off Inchon after taking
part in that amphibious assault, had previously been designated as Task
Force 90 under the command of RAdm James H. Doyle.
The 1st Mar Div was withdrawn from the
operation on 7 October and returned in convoy from blocking positions north
of Seoul to the Inchon area. This was also the date of Corps and Division
embarkation orders directing the loading of about 28,000 men and their
equipment on 71 ships. Next day the Marines began the complicated task of
combat-loading in the Inchon tidal basin. The great tidal range meant that
ships entering at high water must be beached until the next favorable tide
before departing. Troops were embarked with a view to expediency, and an
ordeal of monotony awaited the men crowded into the LSTs. Time dragged
especially for the 1st and 3d Bus of the 1st Marines, who boarded their
LSTs on 10 October and spent five days at anchor off Inchon. The voyage
around the peninsula took 11 more days, counting the interval of Navy
mine-sweeping at Wonsan harbor while the troopships cruised back and forth offshore.
The original plan had called for an
amphibious assault on 20 October by RCTs 1 and 7, with RCT 5 in reserve.
After seizing a beachhead, the 1st Mar Div was to cover the landing of the
7th Inf Div of the U. S. Army. Meanwhile the two divisions of the I ROK
Corps, recently attached to the Eighth Army, were to advance up the east
coast toward the objective area.
Circumstances caused this plan to be
abandoned before many elements of Task Force 90 left Inchon. North Korean
resistance had folded so suddenly that Wonsan fell like a ripe plum to the
fast-moving 3d Div of the I ROK Corps on 10 October. An amphibious assault
being no longer necessary, X Corps planners decided upon the administrative
landing. Afterwards the 1st Mar Div was to slice westward across the
waistline of the peninsula125 miles over difficult mountain roads-and link
up with Eighth Army units for an attack on Pyongyang, the Red Korean
capital.
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The Marines never had a tamer landing.
(Bob Hope even beat them to Wonsan.) The Navy's frogmen and minesweepers
had a tough job, though, clearing the harbor of thousands of mines.
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Again the completeness of the UN victory
confounded high-level planners when Eighth Army units took Pyongyang on 19
October during their sweep northward against scattered resistance. On the
assumption that organized opposition had been crushed, the westward
movement was cancelled on 22 October and X Corps assigned a zone of
operations in Northeast Korea. The new overall plan of the supreme command
called for UN forces to drive to the border of Manchuria. A three-pronged
advance was envisioned by X Corps planners in their zone-the 1st Mar Div on
the left, the 7th Inf Div in the center, I ROK Corps (3d and Capital Divs)
on the right, and the 3d Inf Div in reserve.
On 26 October, while the Marines were
landing, MajGen Edward M. Almond, CG X Corps, directed elements of the
division to proceed from Wonsan by way of Hamhung to the Chosin and Fusen
Reservoirs for an advance to the border. Other Marine, elements were
meanwhile to protect the Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni corridor until the 3d Inf Div
landed.
The fulfillment of these missions would make
it necessary for MajGen Oliver P. Smith, CG 1st Mar Div, to disperse his
units over a vast area stretching 300 miles from Kojo in the south to the
border. Even the immediate objectives, Kojo and Hamhung, were 118 miles
apart. The equation was complicated not only by the time and space factor,
but also by the few supply routes available in rugged mountain country. Finally,
the integrity of units was also to be considered, since a Marine division
functioned at its best as a single integrated instrument .
Altogether, it was a difficult problem in
dispersal and concentration, and the solution was perhaps the most interesting
feature of forthcoming operations.
Broad in scope as Marine assignments were,
it was not expected by X Corps intelligence that much organized resistance
would be encountered. A G-2 report of 21 October concluded that routed NK
remnants planned either to withdraw from the Wonsan area to Manchuria, or
to attempt a last stand in the mountains of northern Korea. It was admitted
that the Chinese or Russians might intervene on behalf of beaten Korean
Reds, but the report added that no evidence of any such development had
been encountered.
Naturally the Marines landing at Wonsan
found themselves plunged into an atmosphere of soaring optimism. "Home
by Christmas!" was the wishful slogan of service troops after the
recent news of the successful descent of Eighth Army paratroops north of
Pyongyang to cut enemy routes of escape. "The war is very definitely
coming to an end shortly," declared Gen Douglas MacArthur, supreme
commander, who watched the operation from the air. "With the closing
of that trap there should be an end to organized resistance."
It could hardly have been imagined by the
Leathernecks on their first day ashore that some of them would be hard
pressed in a hot fire fight within 36 hours. The 1st Marines lost no time
at beginning its mission of protecting the Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni area. As
the initial step, the 1st Bn, reinforced by 4.2 mortar and engineer
platoons, landed at Wonsan about 0900 on 26 October and entrained at 1400
for Kojo, some 35 miles southward along the coast. These troops were assigned
the duty of guarding a ROK supply dump after relieving a battalion of the
23d ROK Regt.
AS A DEPARTURE from the usual autumnal
drizzle, it was a bright blue and gold October day when the 1st Bn (less
one platoon) crowded into gondola cars drawn by an asthmatic little engine:
The war seemed far away, especially when the men noted that the enemy had
neglected an obvious opportunity to blow up tunnels. In keeping with the
holiday mood, Kojo proved to be the most attractive town the Marines had
seen in Koreaan almost undamaged small seaport flanked by the white beaches
and sparkling blue waters of the bay.
Upon arrival at 1600, it was learned that
the supply dump no longer existed, having been moved by ROK forces. But
there remained the tasks of relieving the ROK battalion and protecting the
Kojo area (Map 2). This coastal plain, consisting of wet rice paddies, was
about 5,000 yards in diameter, surrounded by a semicircle of hills forming
a natural perimeter. High ground northwest of town was taken over from the
ROK troops and occupied as the main battalion position by Charlie Co and
two platoons of Able Co. The other Able platoon held Hill 117, just north
of the town, while the two platoons of Baker Co moved out to two hills
southwest of the seaport .
This gave the battalion a thinly-held
perimeter, but ROK officers reported only minor contacts with retreating
Red Korean bands raiding the villages for rice and young women. The train
which brought the Marines was to make a return trip next day, guarded by a
platoon of Baker Co, with more ammunition and supplies. A motor convoy was
also scheduled to arrive from Wonsan on the 27th to provide vehicles and
added equipment.
Despite the tranquil situation, the Marines
neglected no precautions, even to a withdrawal plan. Korean telephone
communication linked the battalion to the regiment at Wonsan until radio
contact was established next day, and a battery of artillery was scheduled
to arrive at Kojo that night.
THE INFORMAL RELIEF of the ROK battalion
took place after a quiet night, and these allies departed with their women
and children in the train which had brought the Marines. Later in the
afternoon the vehicle convoy arrived safely from Wonsan with added
equipment and ammunition. Not until sunset was the brief illusion of peace
shattered by long-range enemy automatic fire on a wire-laying jeep from the
vicinity of Hill 185. Soon the outposts on Hills 185 and 109 were receiving
automatic fire which increased in intensity after dark. Next came probing
attacks in platoon strength, executed with a boldness and precision which
indicated an organized enemy rather than guerrilla bands.
Just before midnight the CO of Baker Co
asked permission to withdraw, after reporting his 3d Plat under attack from
front and flank on Hill 185. Permission being granted by the battalion
commander, all elements were gradually pulled in along the railway track.
This movement was aided by the timely arrival of Fox Btry, 11th Marines.
The gunners immediately set up their howitzers along the beach opposite the
battalion CP and laid down interdicting fires in the zone of Baker Co,
which had been stopped near the village of Chonchon-ni by heavy small arms
and automatic fire from all sides. The battalion commander soon arranged
for radio contact, so that CO Baker Co could direct 4.2 mortar as well as
artillery fires.
At dawn, after a defensive halt of several
hours, the company was ordered to continue its withdrawal toward the
battalion position. A platoon of Able Co. sent out from the battalion position,
helped to carry the wounded through muddy rice paddies. During this
movement an estimated 200 enemy moved westward from Kojo with a view to
interception. These NK troops did not suspect that they were approaching
the battalion position until Able and Charlie Cos opened up at long range
with mortar and automatic fire. The enemy column was dispersed, about 75
being killed, and Baker Co completed its withdrawal.
Both Marine flanks had also been under heavy
attack during the night. On the left the enemy infiltrated through Kojo in
company strength to envelop the Able Co platoon on Hill 117, but the
Leathernecks held their ground in a fire fight lasting an hour. On the
right, a series of probing attacks by enemy squads led up to a coordinated
assault by two companies on Charlie Co. Although some confusion resulted in
the darkness, all positions were restored at daybreak with the aid of
supporting mortar and artillery fires.
Since Kojo no longer contained military
supplies, the CO of the battalion decided on a withdrawal to a tighter
perimeter for all-around protection against superior enemy numbers. Hill
117 offered the best defensive position, and movement commenced about noon
on 28 October under cover of air and artillery. Enemy forces immediately
occupied the high ground of the former battalion position but were evicted
by air strikes.
The three squadrons of MAG-12, one flown in
from Kimpo and the other two from Japan, had begun operations from Wonsan
airfield before the landing of the division. They were followed early in
November by the arrival from Japan of the three squadrons of MAG-33, two of
which operated from CVE carriers and one from Wonsan until the 12th, when
they established their CP at Yonpo airfield.
Excellent air support helped to keep the casualties
of the 1st Bn down to 22 killed, 38 wounded, and eight missing in the Kojo
fight as compared to an estimated 500 enemy casualties. PW interrogations
revealed that the Marines had been attacked by three battalions of the 10th
Regt of the 5th Div-one of the best units of the North Korean army at the
outset of war. Total NK forces in the Kojo area, counting remnants of other
units, were estimated at 4,000 to 7,000.
ON A BASIS OF RADIO REPORTS, the CO of the
1st Marines decided to send the 2d Bn from Wonsan as reinforcements. The 3d
Bn, in accordance with Division orders, was assigned to blocking positions
at Majon-ni, an important road junction about 28 miles west of Wonsan. Two
trains brought the 2d Bn to Kojo at 2230 on the 28th, and these troops shared
a 2,000-yard perimeter with the 1st Bn on Hill 117. Continuous mortar and
artillery fires were placed on all known enemy positions throughout a night
which passed uneventfully. Patrols sent out the next morning reported no
signs of enemy activity, and it was concluded that large enemy forces had
by-passed the Kojo area and continued their retreat along secondary routes
into the hills to the northwest.
MAP
CLICK HERE
Helicopter reconnaissance on 29 October not
only added confirmation but resulted in the picking up of four Marines, cut
off from their units in the confusion of night fighting, who had been
reported missing in action. The word "help." spelled out in rice
straw on the ground, led to the rescue of a Baker Co survivor who had
hidden for 40 hours in a strawstack.
On the 30th an LST reached Kojo Bay with two
platoons of tanks from Co C, 1st Tank Bn. They were not landed, being no
longer needed, and the LST returned to Wonsan the following day.
THUS, THE ACTION at Kojo ended as
unexpectedly as it began. On 1 November the 2d Bn assumed responsibility
for security, and the 1st Bn returned to Wonsan on an LST which had brought
a Korean Marine Corps company. Two days later the 2d Bn was relieved and
moved back to Wonsan by convoy in accordance with Corps orders, leaving the
quiet Kojo area to KMC troops. The two battalions of the 1st Marines were
immediately assigned to blocking positions-the 1st in the Wonsan area, and
the 2d along the Togwan-Majon-ni road.
The 3d Bn, reinforced by an artillery
battery, had reached Majon-ni in convoy on 28 October to find the road
junction a lucrative post for the bagging of prisoners. Retreating North
Korean forces, denied the coastal route through Kojo and Wonsan. were now
attempting to escape through the hills. Some of these fugitives, in fact,
consisted of troops whose units were identified in the recent fight at
Kojo.
About 600 captives were rounded up by
patrols during the first week at Majon-ni. No enemy resistance developed
until 2 November, but during the following week the main supply route to
Wonsan was continually cut. Convoys were turned back on several occasions,
and once an air drop of supplies was necessary. Most of the enemy attempts
consisted of road blocks, either undefended or manned by concealed forces
lying in wait for convoys. And though the resulting fire fights were on a
small scale, a succession of NK efforts testified to the vulnerability of a
single MSR in a mountain area of few and poor roads.
On 7 November the enemy became emboldened to
the extent of attacking Majon-ni itself. The 3d Bn. warned by PW
interrogations, was loaded for bear when a force of undetermined size
assaulted the perimeter with grenades and burp guns. So one-sided was the
ensuing contest that the enemy withdrew after losses of 53 killed and about
130 wounded at a cost to the Marines of three men wounded.
Nevertheless, the problem of supplying the
3d Bn became so serious that X Corps ordered the 1st Marines to patrol the
MSR. A company from each of the other two battalions, plus tanks and
elements of the 1st Engineer Bn, managed to keep the road clear thereafter.
At the finish a bag of 1,300 prisoners left no doubt as to the value of the
occupation of Majon-ni. But Marine staff officers must have speculated as
to what might happen if an entire division went out on a limb, as
represented by a single MSR in mountain country.
On 14-16 November the 1st Marines was
relieved in the southern sector by units of the 3d Inf Div, the leading
elements of which had landed at Wonsan on 7 November (Map 1). Owing to lack
of transportation, delays resulted after these troops and KMC
reinforcements look over the positions of the 1st Marines at Majon-ni and
the Wonsan area. Not until 19 November did the last elements of the
regiment clear Wonsan by rail and motor for an assembly area in the
vicinity of Chigyong. about six miles southwest of Hamhung.
This was the first step in pulling together
Marine units which at times had been proceeding in opposite directions to
carry out their missions. Besides the widely separated northern and
southern zones, the CG 1st Mar Div also had the responsibility for
protecting intervening strategic points. Actually it was a task beyond the
numerical strength of a division, and the solution might not have been
possible except for Marine basic training. Along the MSR between Munchon
and Wonsan, for instance, artillery not attached to regiments served very
creditably as improvised infantry. Tankmen guarded the airfield at Yonpo,
while shore party and amphtrac elements took on infantry duties in
protecting the Wonsan airfield.
UP TO THE MIDDLE of November, indeed, it
might almost have been said that Gen Smith had two separate wars on his
hands-a defensive war in the south against escaping NK remnants, and an
offensive war in the north against Chinese Communist forces. Before the
division finished unloading at Wonsan, the first CCF troops in the X Corps
zone had already been encountered on 30 October northwest of Hamhung.
Sixteen prisoners taken on that date by the 26th Regt of I ROK Corps were
identified as belonging to the 124th CCF Div, and PW interrogations
revealed that Chinese troops had crossed the Yalu as early as 18 October.
In order to carry out its mission to the
border, the 1st Mar Div planned to advance the 7th and 5th RCTs in column
along the Koto-ri-Hagaru-ri axis, to be followed by the 1st RCT after being
relieved in the south. The problems of command were increased by the
multiplicity of X Corps plans and orders, some of which were cancelled and
superseded before they could be put into effect. In extenuation, high-level
planners might have pleaded that the situation was so fluid as to create
the necessity for frequent amendments.
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Anti-guerrilla patrols search houses of
Kojo for by-passed North Koreans, after 1st Marines had prevented enemy
from using escape routes through this village.
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The motives and purposes of Red China
remained a mystery when the Marine advance northward began on 31 October
with RCT 7 completing its lift by rail from Wonsan to Hamhung. As
spearhead, the regiment had orders to relieve the 26th ROK Regt on 2
November in the vicinity of Majon-dong.
Owing to the lack of troops for so many
diversified tasks, the participation of RCT 5 had to be postponed. This
regiment was sent late in October on patrol assignments-the 1st Bn at
Yonghung, and the 2d and 3d Bus in the Munchon area. Not until 2 November
did the latter two units move up to Hamhung, while the other battalion
proceeded from Yonghung to Chigyong for new patrol duties lasting until the
11th. Meanwhile the 7th Marines, youngest regiment of the division, with
the largest percentage of reservists,* had won the distinction of being the
first American unit to engage with CCF troops in all-out combat.
The men had been issued winter clothing at
Wonsan which was appreciated during the 20-mile motor lift from Hamhung to
the Majon-dong area on 1 November. Relief of the 26th ROK Regt, which had
been pushed back by CCF troops, was effected at 1030 next morning with 1/7
and 2/7 assaulting in column and 3/7 in reserve. Only light and scattered
resistance was encountered in a 1,300-yard advance, and at 1630 positions
were consolidated for the night while the ROK regiment pulled out to the
rear. Front line observation indicated that Chinese forces were
concentrating in the Sudong area, which was assigned as the regimental
objective for the following day. Shortly after midnight, however, the enemy
took matters in his own hands by launching a surprise assault.
The Marines occupied an oblong perimeter
about 6,000 yards in length and 2,000 in width . In the advance was 1/7,
with one company in the defile and the other two dug in along the high
ground on each side of the road. Farther back were two companies of 2/7 at
distances of 700 to 1,000 yards from the road, one on the right and one on
the left. The three companies of 3/7 closed up the rear, giving added
protection to the service units, motor transport company, and 3d Bn of the
11th Marines on the inside of the perimeter.
The weird sound of bugles and whistles was
the signal for CCF attacks shortly after midnight on both flanks of 1/7.
Soon 2/7 was receiving small arms, automatic, and mortar fire from front
and flank on each side of the road. At 0430 two tanks approaching the 1st
Bn CP were driven off by 75mm recoilless and 3.5-inch rocket fire, one of
them being destroyed. Some confusion ensued during the night fighting, but
the only temporary enemy penetration was into the 4.2-inch mortar position.
At daybreak the attacks continued with decreasing intensity in the 1st Bn
zone, though infiltrating enemy set up a road block at a bridge south of
Sudong. Covering fire cut the MSR behind the 1st and 2d Bns, so that air
drops of supplies had to be made. Meanwhile the Div Recon Co moved on the
flank of this position in combination with air strikes, forcing an
abandonment of the roadblock late that afternoon.
Chinese losses were estimated at 662 killed
in the 1st Bn zone alone. Firing ceased at dusk and the regiment spent a
quiet night in its perimeter. At 1000 on 4 November, after patrols reported
the enemy withdrawing north of Sudong. the advance began with the 1st and
3d Bus in column and the 2d in reserve. Moderate resistance occurred as the
regiment passed through Sudong and pushed on toward the Chinhung-ni area,
where five enemy tanks were surprised by infantry and air. Only one escaped
with a whole skin, the others being destroyed by 3.5-inch rockets, airplane
rockets, and 75mm recoilless fire. After an advance of 6,000 yards the
regiment dug in for the night on high ground in the vicinity of Chinhung-ni.
THE MARINE ATTACK was continued on the
morning of the 5th against Chinese resistance which stiffened to such an
extent that the regiment forged ahead only 300 yards. Heavy automatic,
mortar, and even artillery fire hit the Marines at the jump-off, and the
best efforts of supporting arms could not dislodge the enemy from prepared
positions on the high ground on both sides of the road. The next day's
attack was a repetition, and twice the 3d Bn had to repel counterattacks in
company strength after passing through the 1st Bn to lead an advance of
about 1,000 yards.
In 48 hours of hard fighting the
Leathernecks had gained less than a mile. Yet it was this period of hard
slugging which broke the back of Chinese resistance as Marine air and
artillery hammered away at well-concealed positions along reverse slopes.
For on 7 November the 3d Bn moved out to find the enemy withdrawn from the
high ground commanding Chinhung-ni. Patrols reported no contacts and OY
observation spotted CCF remnants retreating toward the Yudam-ni area, which
was thoroughly worked over by Marine air.
This was the finish of the four-day fight
representing the first large-scale clash of American troops with the forces
of Red China. PW interrogations revealed that the 7th Marines had collided
with three regiments of the 124th CCF Div. The Leathernecks had not won an
easy victory, what with losses of 46 killed and 264 wounded. But estimates
of enemy casualties ran as high as 9,000, and G-2 reports established that
the Chinese division had been so severely mauled that it virtually ceased
to exist as an effective unit.
THESE MATERIAL RESULTS were no more
important than the moral gains. Chinese guerrilla techniques had won a
formidable reputation not only in WW II but also during the ensuing civil struggle
between Communists and Nationalists. This tactical system, in fact, had
been adopted in large part by the North Korean army, so that the Marines
encountered no radically new methods or weapons except the bugles or
whistles used for signalling. CCF units appeared to be better trained and
led, however, than a majority of the NK troops. They pushed home their
night attacks with more skill and persistence, and their comand functioned
much better above the company level. Tactical maneuvers were executed with
precise timing and direction, though little initiative appeared to be
exercised at the platoon and company level.
Barring such lapses, the new enemy had shown
himself to be a stubborn and dangerous adversary in mountain country made
to order for his tactics. Nevertheless, the fight from Sudong to
Chinhung-ni had demonstrated the all-around soundness of Marine command and
basic training at a ruinous cost to the Chinese. The precept, as an example
set for all other American units in Korea, was one of the most worthwhile
results of the victory won by the 7th Marines.
On 10 November, after two days devoted to
patrolling, the regiment moved unopposed by motor lift from positions 1,000
yards north of Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri. Patrols sent out from this point reported
only a minor enemy contact in 48 hours. And on the 13th the advance was
continued toward Hagaru-ri. where all three battalions were assembled
during the next two days.
The middle of November dates a second stage
in the concentration of 1st Mar Div elements as RCT-5 moved up behind
RCT-7. On 4 November, after two days in Hamhung, 2/5 and 3/5 had been sent
by X Corps orders on reconnaissance into the Sinhung Valley stretching
northward to the Fusen Reservoir. No large enemy forces being met in extensive
patrolling, the two battalions were recalled on the 10th to Hamhung. During
the next three days RCT-5 was assigned to protective positions along the
Hamhung-Hagaru-ri MSR-3/5 at Chinhung-ni, 2/5 at Koto-ri, and 1/5 at
Majon-dong after being relieved at Chigyong. Meanwhile, RCT-1 was being
relieved in the south to advance to an assembly area at Chigyong.
From 15 to 19 November the positions of
Marine units remained little changed. No enemy were contacted except a CCF
force of 200, dispersed west of Hagaru-ri by an attack of the 1st Bn,
RCT-7. At this time the 1st Mar Div appeared to be making a tortoise's
progress as compared to the gains of other X Corps units in the north.
Elements of I ROK Corps, driving along the coast, had already advanced to
the important Nanam-Chongji industrial area only a few miles south of the
Manchurian border. And though the 7th Inf Div had landed three days later
than the Marines, Gen Smith sent his congratulations on 22 November to
MajGen David G. Barr, commanding the Army troops who reached the Yalu River
near Hyesanjin. Neither the ROK forces nor the 7th Div had met any serious
opposition, despite the persistent reports to Corps and Division G-2 of
large CCF forces infiltrating down from the border.
Many of these reports were based on
information given by terrified Korean refugees from mountain villages. If
such rumors were to be taken seriously, there was reason for alarm as to
enemy strength. On 19 November, for instance, a civilian reported 50,000
enemy soldiers to be approaching Hagaru-ri. Refugees declared the next day
that 13,000 CCF troops were in the vicinity of Sinhung-ni.
SUCH VAGUE ESTIMATES had to be taken with a
grain of salt, for a different story was told by actual observation and
contacts. If these sources were to be credited, no enemy force larger than
a few hundred had been seen since the retreat of the defeated and decimated
124th CCF Div. Thus it was that 1st Mar Div G-2 concluded on 24 November
that "aerial observation . . . together with lack of aggressiveness on
part of enemy in 5th and 7th Marines' area indicate a generally defensive
attitude." But the same analysis warned that "increased activity
along MSR and against our left flank is likely and is not to be considered
lightly."
Such was the confidence of high-level
planners that X Corps sent instructions to the 1st Mar Div on 20 November
concerning the occupation of the Yalu line. Political rather than military
aspects were emphasized, and it was stated that only units of minimum size
would be sent to the immediate vicinity of the border. The integrity of
Manchurian territory, in short, was to be meticulously respected.
The 1st Mar Div was still about 125 road
miles from the border on this date. But the lesson of the Majon-ni MSR had
not been wasted, and Gen Smith neglected no measures for the protection of
a larger force at the end of a longer route. Relying on personal
observation as well as G-2 reports, he made helicopter flights over the
tortuous length of Korean mountain road that was soon to become
world-famous.
The first 33 miles beyond Hamhung were
served by a narrow-gauge railway ending at Chinhung-ni. Up to this point
the parallel road climbed gradually, but from the railhead "over the
hump" to Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri an ascent of 2,400 feet was made in one
stretch of 10,000 yards.
This was the MSR-a total of 56 road miles
from Hamhung to the foot of Chosin Reservoir, nearly half of them
consisting of a winding, dirt trail clinging precariously to the sides of
bleak mountains. A skid might send a supply truck over the edge to the
rocks a hundred feet below, or an ailing carburetor might halt an entire
convoy. Yet the welfare of thousands of Marines depended on keeping the
wheels rolling along the MSR from Hamhung to Hagaru-ri!
Seldom in Marine Corps history has every
decision of command been fraught with as much significance. And it is
noteworthy that at a time of general optimism, both in top-level military
and state circles, Gen Smith felt grave concern as early as 15 November
over the situation of the 1st Mar Div. Not only was its left flank wide
open, but a gap of 80 miles invited enemy penetration between the Marines
and the nearest units of the Eighth Army to the west. Not only were large
CCF forces rumored to be in northern Korea, but another formidable enemy
had already invaded the mountains-the first zero nights, indicating the
approach of General Winter. On 14 November, while inspecting installations
at Koto-ri, the CG 1st Mar Div found the small streams frozen and the MSR
glazed in places with ice. Cases of frostbite had been reported by the 7th
Marines, though the men were equipped with parkas and sleeping bags.
Corps orders left a good deal of latitude to
units in the mission to the border, and during the period from 13 to 20
Novemher Gen Smith made haste slowly and methodically. Supplies and
ammunition were sent by rail from Hamhung to Chinhung-ni, then trucked to
dumps at Kotori and Hagaru-ri. Engineers worked tirelessly on the MSR,
installing culverts and making ready for icy going. As added logistical
insurance, plans were approved for building a 5,000-foot strip for C-47s
and C-119s at Hagaru-ri, though air alone could not solve the supply
problem.
FROM 20 TO 22 NOVEMBER, moreover, Gen Smith
put into effect the third step of his concentration. New X Corps orders
sent RCT-7 forward on the west side of Chosin Reservoir and RCT-5 on the
east side. RCT-1 was to be relieved at Chigyong by 3d Inf Div elements and
ROKs, thus making it possible for the CG 1st Mar Div to carry out his
preconceived plan of moving up that regiment to guard the MSR. Thus, in
effect, the division would have two RCTs in assault and one in reserve,
with the 11th Marines and other support units being disposed where they could
be most useful.
The Marine advance was ordered in
preparation for the combined offensive of the Eighth Army and X Corps,
scheduled for the 24th. From the 21st until that date the 5th Marines
patrolled vigorously east of the Reservoir, covering a wide area without
flushing out any large enemy group. The same ominous lull prevailed west of
the Reservoir along the steep 14-mile road from Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni.
Baker Co of the 7th Marines, plodding through snowdrifts, reached the
halfway point at Sinhung-ni on the 22d, meeting only a retiring enemy force
of about company strength. The entire 1st Bn continued to push toward
Yudam-ni during the next two days, advancing 2,500 yards northwest of
Sinhung-ni against negligible opposition consisting largely of undefended
road blocks.
ON 24 NOVEMBER, D-DAY of the combined
offensive, Gen Douglas MacArthur's message was read to X Corps troops.
"The massive compression envelopment in North Korea against the new
Red armies operating there is now approaching its decisive effort."
declared the supreme commander. During the past three weeks, he added, our
air forces had successfully interdicted CCF lines of support from the north
so as to cut off reinforcements. Meanwhile the eastern or X Corps sector of
the pincers had advanced to reach a commanding enveloping position.
"This morning the western sector of the pincer moves forward in
general assault to complete the compression and close the vise. If
successful, this should for all practicable purposes end the war."
Despite the optimism of the message, there
were disturbing indications at this date that at least four CCF divisions
might be advancing into the zone of the 1st Mar Div. Air reconnaissance
still reported no large enemy groups observed, though noting such clues as paths
left by many footprints. It seemed incredible that large enemy forces were
hiding by day in villages, for it was not then known that a battalion of
Chinese could crowd into a hamlet of 20 houses. Nevertheless, Division G-2
could not discount PW identifications of these CCF units-the 60th, 59th,
and 58th Divs of the 20th Army, and the attached 89th Div. The first three,
in that order, were reported to be approaching the Yudam-ni area on 21 or
22 November.
New X Corps orders of the 24th outlined the
part of the 1st Mar Div in the general offensive. RCT-7 was to seize
Yudam-ni at once. RCT-5. upon relief by 7th Inf Div elements, was to
advance into the Yudaru-ni area after shifting from the east to the west
side of Chosin Reservoir. Before these moves could be made, the situation
was changed by reports of heavy resistance encountered by the Eighth Army.
Amended X Corps orders of the 25th, therefore, called for a 1st Mar Div
drive westward to cut CCF communications at Mupyong-ni. The object of this
attack on the enemy's flank was to relieve pressure on the Eighth Army (Map
1).
The Division plan of 26 November directed
RCT-5 to pass through RCT-7 west of Yudam-ni and advance to the west.
Relief of the former was effected by the 1st Bn, 32d Inf, and that evening
2/5 entered the perimeter of RCT-7, which had occupied Yudam-ni the
previous afternoon against light resistance.
Meanwhile, RCT-1 had completed its movement
from the Chigyong area to defensive positions along the MSR -1/1 at
Chinhung-ni, 2/1 at Koto-ri, and 3/1 at Hagaru-ri. Thus the entire division
was pulled together into an area that could be traversed from front to rear
in an hour by jeep.
AT 0830 ON THE 27TH the 2d Bn of RCT-5
passed through elements of RCT-7 and continued the attack west of Yudam-ni,
while the latter regiment sent out patrols and seized two hills still held
by by-passed enemy elements. At last, after five days of suspiciously light
resistance in this zone, the Chinese put up a stiff fight against 2/5 with
automatic and mortar fire from prepared positions. Air strikes and
artillery fires had to be requested for the reduction of CCF pillboxes. The
assault troops gained 1600 yards, then dug in for the night astride the
road about 6500 yards west of Yudam-ni. The other two battalions of RCT-5
moved up to an assembly area in the rear, while RCT-7 occupied positions
about 4900 yards southwest of the town.
By this time, unfortunately, the situation
of the Eighth Army had deteriorated too far for the Marine advance to
relieve the pressure. Large CCF forces, driving through the mountains into
the gap between Eighth Army and X Corps units, struck the former on the
25th. The disintegration of the II ROK Corps on the right flank
necessitated a general Eighth Army withdrawal on the 26th which reached
serious proportions the following day. Meanwhile the Chinese were
completing their infiltration into the X Corps zone.
In the Yudam-ni area the first few hours of
darkness on the 27th were uneventful. Then, just before midnight, both the
5th and 7th Marines came under heavy attack. This was the beginning of the
great CCF counterstroke in the X Corps zone that was to make 28 November a
landmark of Marine Corps history. Air observation that morning revealed
that the MSR had been severed by formidable CCF numbers between Koto-ri and
Hagaru-ri as well as between the latter point and Yudam-ni. Thus the 5th
and 7th Marines, cut off from the rest of the division, were forced to
withdraw into a perimeter near Yudam-ni as heavy pressure was applied in
their rear. The retreat of the Eighth Army added to the isolation of the
two Marine regiments threatened with envelopment by crushing numbers.
CCF FORCES, MARCHING BY NIGHT and hiding in
villages or caves by day, had contrived to move eight divisions within
striking distance of the 1st Mar Div. As it later appeared, the CCF command
had chosen between three courses of action. An attack might have been aimed
southward through the 3d Inf Div, scattered over an area of 400 square
miles, to seize the vital Hungham-Hamhung supply base. Or an attack might
have been launched in the north with the object of cutting off the
dispersed 7th Inf Div and I ROK Corps. But the Chinese generals elected to
hurl their massed strength against the 1st Mar Div-the only relatively
concentrated unit of X Corps.
This concentration, completed within the
last 48 hours, had been the steadfast goal of Gen Smith, whose writings
reveal a grimly realistic view of the situation throughout the past two
weeks. When the blow fell, he set up his CP at Hagaru-ri on the 28th to
take personal charge of the defense after flying with his staff from
Hungham.
If the 1st Mar Div had seemed to advance
like a tortoise as compared to other X Corps units, it was now able to
withdraw into a defensive shell made possible by concentration. Far from
finding a dispersed force, the enemy was confronted by four bristling
perimeters, held in battalion strength or greater, at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri.
Koto-ri, and Chinhung-ni. Within these fortresses Marine firepower was
prepared to operate on a 360° front, and Marine service troops were
prepared to double as infantry. For the 1st Mar Div was up against a fight
for survival, and every Leatherneck from Gen Smith to the newest private
would be needed to beat off an overwhelming enemy.
Next Month: Breakout From the
Reservoir-Marine Epic of Fire and Ice.
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[Sidebar]
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In cooperation with the Historical
Division, Headquarter, U. S. Marine Corps, the GAZETTE herewith presents
another in a series of official accounts dealing with Marine operations
in Korea. Prepared by writers and researchers of the Historical Division,
these articles are based on available records and reports from units in
Korea. Also to be treated in this series:
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The Chosin Reservoir Breakout
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Anti-Guerrilla Operations in South Korea
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The Drive to the 38th Parallel
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Publication is scheduled for consecutive
monthly issues.
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Admittedly it is too soon to write a
definitive history of Marine fighting in Korea. Not only are enemy
sources lacking, hut even Marine and Army records are still incomplete.
Articles of the length to be used in the GAZETTE, moreover, do not allow
space for more than an outline of operations which will ultimately be
given the detailed treatment of a monograph.
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But timeliness is also an end to be
sought, and these preliminary narratives are based on Marine and Army
reports received up to this time. These articles are presented in the
hope that GAZETTE readers will feel free to add to the incomplete record.
This is an invitation, therefore, for you to supplement the existing
record. Send your comments and criticisms, as well as any other
information you can make available, to the Historical Division,
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.
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[Footnote]
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* The story of Inchon-Seoul was told in
the July and August issues of the GAZETTE.
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[Footnote]
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* An article by Capt Ernest H. Guisti,
in the September issue of the GAZETTE, was devoted to the Minute Men of
1950-the reservists of the Marine Corps.
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